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LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES

lumen-seconds for black and white has been announced by General Electric Company. Its dimensions permit use in some sort of rapid fire
mechanism resembling the dip of an automatic
pistol. (JDN)
Nite-Eye Infra-Red Viewer-The Q.O.S. Corporation, 621 East 216th Street, New York 67,

New York, has announced the availability of an
infrared viewer weighing five pounds, capable of
positive identification of subjects up to 150 feet
away. Identification of major characteristics can
be made as far as 400 feet. The weight noted above
does not include power for the infrared lamp. This
power may be supplied by 12 volt battery or from
a cigarette lighter plug-in. (JDN)

POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES

Francis A. Heroux*

Policeman Recovers for Libelous Complaint of
Irate Citizen-After the defendant received a ticket
for parking overtime at a parking meter, he sent
an enraged complaint to the City Mayor. The letter
stated among other things that "your tinhorn cop
sits in nearby concealment sipping beer until he
sees a car parked over 12 minutes at a defective
meter, and then sneaks over, places a ticket on the
car and hustles back to his beer. I can smell skunk
perfume a long way and this definitely smells like
a racket, and the situation stinks". The policeman
began an action for libel and, upon the defendant's
demurrer, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that the letter was libelous per se and entitled the
policeman to sue for damages. Thompson v. Upton,
146 A. 2d 880 (Maryland 1958).
The court interpreted the letter as exposing the
policeman to public scorn, hatred, contempt and
ridicule, and also charging him with conduct which
would make him unfit to carry out, faithfully and
correctly, his duties as a policeman. Both of these
results are included within libel and are actionable.
The defendant argued that the letter should be
interpreted as an average person would understand
it and thus it should be treated in a humorous vein.
The court rejected this, pointing out that when
such charges are leveled at a law enforcement officer they are of a grave and serious character.

measurement of the dilation of the pupils of the
eyes before and after the administration of the
drug indicated the recent use of narcotics. Defendant consented in writing to the test and conceded
that such consent was freely and voluntarily given.
The Appellate Department of the Superior Court,
Alameda County, California affirmed, holding that
the opinion evidence of the physician, based upon
the test, was admissable. People v. Williams, 331
P. 2d 251 (Cal. 1958).
The defendant contended upon appeal that the
Nalline test was not generally accepted by the
medical profession and that its results were inadmissable as evidence against him. The court noted,
however, that the medical testimony was undisputed that the Nalline test was known to be reliable among those who would be expected to be
familiar with its use. Furthermore, the legislature
had specifically authorized the use of synthetic
opiate anti-narcotic agents and this was interpreted
as a legislative mandate that the results of such
tests had probative value.
The defendant also contended that venue, was
improper as it was never shown where the narcotics were taken. The court held that venue was
proper anywhere the defendant was apprehended
as the offense consisted of the presence of narcotics
in the system and not of the taking of narcotics.

Nafline Narcotic Test Upheld-Defendant was
convicted for the violation of a statute making it
unlawful to be under the influence of narcotics.
Nalline, an anti-narcotic agent, was administered
to the defendant by a physician and a comparative
* Senior law student, Northwestern University
School of Law.

Police Officer Exercises Sovereign Power of the
State and Therefore Immune from Civil LiabilityThe plaintiff sued .a policeman to recover damages
for a wrongful death, alleging that his decedent's
death resulted from an assault and battery committed by the policeman while performing his
assigned duties. The defendant moved for summary
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judgment on the grounds that the policeman was
an "officer" of a sovereign power, and thus immune from suit, just as his employer, the City of
Los Angeles. The California District Court granted
summary judgment, holding that a policeman is an
"officer" of the city and immune from suit until a
claim is filed against the city. Davis v. Hendricks,
336 P. 2d 247 (Cal. 1959).
The court said that while a policeman may not
be an officer in every sense of the term, in the discharge of his duties he does stand in a relationship
to the governing authority differing greatly from
that of a mere employee or agent. This relationship, for many purposes, is indistinguishable from,
and may be classified as, that of a "public officer."
Blood Sample Taken From Unconscious Defendant is Improper Evidence-The defendant was
involved in an automobile accident sustaining
serious injuries. He was taken to a hospital and,
while unconscious, a sample of his blood was taken
for analysis. The sample proved that the blood
contained .15% alcohol and such percentage indicated intoxication. Subsequently, suit was brought
for the wrongful death of the other motorist involved in the accident. At the trial, the defendant
objected to the use of the blood sample as evidence.
The lower court overruled the objection, but, on
appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld this
objection, holding that the taking of blood for
purposes of analysis from the person of one who is
unconscious at the time constitutes a violation of
his rights, and that testimony based on the analysis of such blood should not be admitted in evidence. Lebel v. Swincicki, 93 N.W. 2d 281 (Mich.
1958).
The defendant contended that he was unconscious at the time the blood was taken from him,
that he knew nothing about it and at no time gave
his consent to the taking. Thus, he argued that this
action', without consent, should-be held to violate
the right to the security of the person guaranteed
by the Michigan Constitution. The court accepted
this argument, noting that in an analogous situation, a criminal defendant must consent before he
can be physcially examined. If consent is a neces-
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sary element, and since no defendant can give his
consent when he is unconscious, the taking of the
blood sample in this case was a violation of defendant's rights.
Validity of Search Warrant Immaterial if Police
Have a Common Law Right to Search-The defendant, a restaurant owner, was prosecuted for
receiving and concealing stolen property-a cash
register. He filed a motion to quash the search
warrant and to suppress the evidence seized in the
search. The Supreme Court of Indiana upheld the
search warrant and the conviction. Brown v.
Indiana, 157 N.E. 2d 174 (Ind. 1959).
In the course of its opinion the court dealt with
a side issue to support its conclusion. Upon argument, the defendant had accepted the fact that
the cash register in question was in plain view of
the officers when they entered the restaurant and
also that the restaurant was a place open to the
public. Thus, the defendant conceded that no
search warrant was necessary to enter the premises
when operated openly and to which the public was
invited. However, the defendant urged that, if the
search warrant was invalid, then any search pursuant to it was also invalid. Or, stated another way,
that the police had no right to rely upon their
common law rights to make a search if they were
acting pursuant to an improper warrant.
The court rejected this argument, stating that it
would not sanction such a supertechnical argument
where there was no statute or constitutional provision compelling such a result. If the court had
accepted this argument, it would have meant that
an arresting officer, acting under what he thought
was a valid warrant, could not defend in a suit for
false arrest or imprisonment if the warrant was
later shown to be invalid for any technical reason.
This would be so, even though the policeman had
probable cause and good ground to arrest for a
felony without a warrant. In dealing with this
problem in dictum, the court has seemingly set it
to rest.
(For other recent case abstracts see pp. 185186).

